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Introduction
In a previous report (Layton, Smith and McCoy, 1993), an empirical study of 30 pilots using the
Flight Planning Testbed was reported. This report describes an identical experiment using the
Flight Planning Testbed (FPT), except that 27 airline dispatchers were studied.
Five general questions were addressed in this study:
1. Under what circumstances does the introduction of computer-generated suggestions
(flight plans) influence the planning behavior of dispatchers (either in a beneficial or
adverse manner)?
2. What is the nature of such influences (i.e., how are the person's cognitive
processes changed)?
3. How beneficial are the general design concepts underlying FPT (use of a
graphical interface, embedding graphics in a spreadsheet, etc.)?
4. How effective are the specific implementation decisions made in realizing
these general design concepts?
5. How effectively do dispatchers evaluate situations requiring replanning, and
how effectively do they identify appropriate solutions to these situations?
Below, we describe the design features of FPT, the methods used in this empirical study and our
new f'mdings. Because this is a replication of the previous study with 30 pilots (except for the fact
that dispatchers were used as subjects), readers familiar with the previous report may want to skip
the following sections on "The Context", "The Flight Planning Testbed - Design Features", and
"Methods", and begin reading the section on "Results and Discussion."
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Enroute flight planning (Cohen, Leddo and Tolcott, 1989; Johannsen and Rouse, 1983; Rudolf,
Homokoi and Sexton, 1990; Sorenson, Waters and Patmore, 1983) involves the modification of
the aircraft route of flight (flight plan) of an airborne aircraft in response to problems with weather,
air traffic, medical emergencies, mechanical failures, etc. The flight crew, air traffic controllers
and airline company dispatchers all play important roles in this planning process.
The flight plan stipulates what altitude and heading the plane will fly during various phases of the
flight and what route the plane will take. The route in turn leads to the weather and air traffic that
will be encountered along the way, affecting speed, safety, fuel efficiency, passenger comfort and
arrival time.
The planner, then, is concerned with getting from a given origin to a given destination in a timely
and cost-effective fashion, while maintaining flight safety and passenger comfort. The planner
must consider what routes to take (these routes consist of navigational f'txes and jet routes, the so-
called 'highways in the sky' that connect the navigational fixes), what altitudes to fly, what
weather to avoid (including winds, thunderstorms, freezing rain, and turbulence), and he/she must
consider the ever changing characteristics of the plane (for example, the weight of the plane
decreases as more fuel is consumed).
The initial flight plan is rarely followed exactly, due to unforeseen events occurring while enroute.
Indeed, minor changes in flight plans are frequently made and major changes are common.
Theseamendmentsto theoriginalplanaredueto thedynamic,unpredictablenatureof the"world"
in whichtheplansarecarriedout. Weatherpatternsdonotalwaysdevelopaspredicted,resulting
in unexpectedareasof turbulence,lessfavorabletail windsor stormsthatmustbeavoided.Air
traffic congestionmaydelaytake-offor restricttheplaneto lower thanplannedaltitudes.Airport
or runwayclosurescancausemajordisruptions,notjust for oneaircraft,but for everyone
planningon landingatthatairport.Mechanicalfailures,medicalemergenciesorothercritical
problemsmayforcetheplaneto divertto anunplannedairport.
In short,enrouteflight planningis very largeandcomplexproblem.Multiple goalsmustbe
consideredin ahighlystochasticenvironmentwheremultipleplansmustbecoordinated(Hayes-
RothandHayes-Roth,1979;Hoc, 1988;Miller, GalanterandPribram,1960;Sacerdoti,1974;
SchankandAbelson,1977;Stef'tk,1981;Suchman,1987;Wilensky, 1983).
The Fli_,ht Planning, Testbed -Design Features
The Flight Planning Testbed (FPT) was developed to test several cooperative planning system
design concepts (Coombs and Alty, 1987; Lehner and Zirk, 1987; Shute and Smith, 1993;
Thierauf, 1988). This design was developed following an extensive cognitive task analysis
(Smith, McCoy, Layton, and Bihari, 1992). The basic flight planning system performs a number
of functions in response to input from a human operator. The system allows the user (either a pilot
or a dispatcher) to develop and display up to four flight plans in conjunction with weather
information and to obtain feedback in terms of flight parameters such as fuel, time, and distance.
The weather information consists of both graphic depictions and verbal descriptions and can be
displayed at several altitudes. The displays show the entire flight path, thus emphasizing global
solutions to problems. In addition, the person can manipulate the display time to see the
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relationshipbetweentheweatherinformationandtheplane'sposition. Thesystemcomputesthe
optimalaltitudeprofile to minimizefuel consumption,arrivaltimesatnavigationalfixes,andfuel
remainingat thosefixes,basedonwindcomponents.It will alsodeterminetheseflight parameters
givenauser-selectedaltitudeprofile.
ThebasicsystemrunsonaMacintoshllfx with twocolor monitors.Thefeaturesandfunctionson
eachmonitorarediscussedin turn below.
Left Monitor
Thedisplaysandcontrolson theleft monitorareshownin Figure1.(In all of thefigureswhich
depictsystemdisplays,someof the informationlosessaliencyasprintedherein blackandwhite
insteadof color.)
InsertFigure1abouthere
Theprimaryfeatureon theleft monitoris amapdisplay. Thisdisplay depicts the continental
United States, the aircraft position, and planned routes. Several pieces of information can be
overlaid on this map. This information includes:
1. Weather information, with overlays of composite cloud and composite radar charts, fronts,
and cloud cover, radar and winds at specific altitudes.
2. Navigational fixes and jet routes. (See Figure 2.)
All weather information is available for two display times, the 'current' time and a one hour
forecast. When a forecast is displayed, the aircraft is displayed in its predicted position (on each
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route)attheforecastime,aswell asat itscurrentposition.Theusercanalso'zoomin' on a region
of the map, which replaces that map of the continental U.S. with a magnification of an area
surrounding an operator-selected poinL
Insert Figure 2 about here
Right Monitor
The right monitor displays and controls are shown in Figure 3. It displays a 'flight log' of a route.
This flight log is essentially a spreadsheet which depicts each segment of the route (i.e., all of the
navigational fixes and jet routes which make up the route), as well as information pertinent to those
segments. The flight log also graphically displays the planned altitudes for the route and the least-
fuel-consumption altitudes for that route. Finally, the flight log displays weather information
which is pertinent to the route. For example, turbulence information is on by default, but the
person can also select information on the winds. The turbulence information that is presented is a
one-word summary of the maximum turbulence on a given flight segmenL The operator can get a
more detailed description of that information (available 'pilot reports' or 'pireps') by selecting
('clicking' on) the one-word summary.
Insert Figure 3 about here
The other display on this monitor (at the bottom of the screen) shows important flight parameters
for all four alternative routes upon arrival at the destination. These parameters include time of
arrival,timeenroute,fuel remaining,andtotaldistance.Thisdisplayallowsusersto comparethe
'bottom line' for each route.
FPT - Important Features
The design principles underlying FPT as a cooperative planning system are discussed in detail in
Smith, McCoy, Layton and Bihari (1992). Five of the most significant considerations, however,
are:
1. Provide tools that allow cooperative planning at different levels of abstraction
(inspired by the work of Sacerdotti, 1974; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979;
Shute and Smith, 1993; and Suchman, 1987);
2. Provide the human planner with data displays and representations to support plan
generation and evaluation at these different levels of abstraction;
3. Provide interfaces to the available support tools that allow the person to easily
communicate desired tradeoffs among goals;
4. Provide tools that help the person predict the outcomes of various plans (Coombs
and Alty, 1987);
5. Incorporate a graphical interface that allows the person to view and explore
alternative plans in the context of the relevant data (i.e.,weather displays).
Below we describe an empirical study to assess some of these design considerations.
Methods
In the study described below, FPT was used as a testbed to study the effects of different design
features on cooperative problem solving performance. Briefly, each of the twenty seven subjects
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(professionalairlinedispatchers)wasaskedto thinkaloud(EricssonandSimon,1984)asheused
oneof threealternativesystemdesigns.(Subjectswererandomlyassignedto thealternativesystem
versions.)Eachsubjectwastrainedontheuseof thatversionof thesystemandgivenfourcases
to solve.
System Designs
As mentioned above, three different enroute flight planning support systems were designed. In
actuality, these three systems represented variations on the levels and timing of support provided
by the computer. These variations on the system design represented the independent variable
studied in this experiment.
The 'Sketching Only' System. The 'sketching only' system allowed the human planner to
sketch proposed flight paths on a map display, while the computer filled in lower level details
(such as fuel remaining, time of arrival, and recommended altitudes) using an optimization
program. In this version, the person was responsible for proposing the alternate paths, while the
computer was responsible for providing feedback on those solutions.
The sketching of routes was carried out by displaying the jet routes and navigational fixes and
selecting ('clicking' on) each navigational fix that the dispatcher wanted the airplane to pass
through. This placed a slight restriction on planning because vectoring can normally be requested
to fly direct routes from one point to another. However, this approach allowed the planner to
develop general solutions with the understanding that these solutions were not necessarily the exact
routes that would be flown.
The 'Route Constraints and Sketching' System. The 'route constraints and sketching'
system retained all of the capabilities of the 'sketching only' system and it added another capability:
The person could specify higher level constraints on the solution he desired and then ask the
computer to find the shortest distance route which satisfied those constraints. The constraints that
could be Specified were the maximum allowable turbulence, the maximum allowable precipitation,
and the destination. (It is easy to see how this interface design concept could be extended to
include other constraints such as earliest and latest desired arrival times or percentage of passengers
making their connections.)
The user could specify constraints on the solution he desired from the computer. The computer
would then recommend alternatives. In addition, the user had a means, through the sketching tool,
of exploring specific routes himself.
The 'Automatic Route Constraints, Route Constraints, and Sketching' System.
The 'automatic route constraints, route constraints, and sketching' version took the computer's
involvement one step further in that the computer automatically suggested a deviation (based on
default constraints of no turbulence, no precipitation, and the originally planned destination) as
soon as it detected a problem with the original route. This form of tool is akin to an autonomous
support system that automatically suggests solutions to detected problems. This system also made
available the 'route constraints' tool of the previous system and the 'sketching' tool of the previous
two systems.
Underlying all three system designs is the incorporation of tools to support asking "what if"
questions. That is, these tools help the operator to ask "what if I do this?" (e.g., "What type of
solution does the computer suggest if I use constraints of light turbulence and moderate
9
precipitation?",or"What happensto my fuel remainingif I deviatenorthinsteadof south?"). We
were interested in whether people used the tools available to them, how the available tools affected
the cognitive processes of the person using the system, and how the available tools affected the
solutions that person chose.
Cases - Characteristics and General Predictions
Following training on the use of the system, each of the subjects was presented four enroute flight
planning cases in which he was given some preliminary information about the flight (e.g., origin,
destination, time of day, etc.) and was then told to "decide what the plane should do". All of the
subjects went through the same four cases in the same order. Whereas the subjects in the
'sketching only' and 'route constraints and sketching' conditions started each case with only their
original route of flight, the subjects in the 'automatic route constraints, route constraints, and
sketching' condition were also given an alternate route suggested by the computer based on the
default constraints of finding a route that was predicted to avoid all turbulence and precipitation.
Cases 1-3 can all be characterized as having large "solution spaces", that is, the number of
plausible specific flight paths available to accomplish a particular deviation (such as going north of
the storm) was very large. This characteristic was expected to put the subjects in the 'sketching
only' version at a disadvantage in terms of finding fuel and time-efficient alternative routes. It was
also expected to cause the 'sketching only' subjects to develop a larger number of specific flight
plans for comparison.
All four cases could be described as having a large "data space" in the sense that the types and
amounts of data available in the different displays were fairly large (although still small by
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comparisonwith thetypesandamountscurrentlybeingproposedfor commercialsystemsat
severalof themajorairlines).Thischaracteristicwasexpectedto bemostimportantin Case2
(whereafailureto notetheheadwindsto thesouthmightleadto selectionof thelessefficient
southerndeviationby subjectssketchingtheir ownsolutions)andin Case3 (whereafailureto
look carefullyatthelocationof theplanein relationto currentandforecastweathermight
contributeto theacceptanceof apoorplan).
Case3hadthefurtherpropertythatthelimitationsof thecomputer'sknowledgeledto "brittle"
performance,in whichthecomputergeneratedaverypoorsuggestionfor analternativeroute.
Thisbrittlenesswasdueto thefactthatin searchingfor flight plans,thecomputertreatedforecasts
asreality. Uncertaintyassociatedwith theforecastswasnotconsideredin thecomputer's
reasoning.Thiscasewasincludedto seewhethersubjectsin the 'automatic'versionwould be
morelikely to bedrawninto thecomputer's"world", consequentlyfailing to usetheirown
knowledgeof theuncertaintyassociatedwith suchaforecasto rejectthecomputer's
recommendation.
FinallyCase4, whichhasamuchsmaller"solutionspace,"is interestingbecauseit introducesa
conflictbetweenacommonheuristicusedin selectingaflight amendmentandthefuel andtime
efficiencyof thealternativeroutes. Furtherdetailson thesecasesareincludedin discussionsof
theresults.
Results and Discussion
A total of twenty-seven dispatchers from nine commercial airlines were studied. Ten used the
'sketching only' version of FlWl",9 the 'route constraints' version, and 8 the 'automatic' version.
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Thesedispatchershadfrom two to twenty-twoyearsof experienceasprofessionaldispatchers,
with anaverageof 9.2years.Therewasnoobviousrelationshipbetweenanyof theperformance
measures(reportedin thefollowing sections)andyearsof experience.
Subjective Responses
Since the subjects in this study were professional dispatchers, their reactions to the system
represent valuable data concerning:
1. The potential usefulness of such a tool to aid them in their job;
2. The value of the general design concepts underlying the system.
In particular, these general design concepts include the use of a graphical interface for the
generation of alternative flight plans, the availability of the route constraints function to control
computer-generated flight plans, and the embedding of graphics in the spreadsheet to provide
access to data on turbulence and winds along the planned route.
'Sketching Only' Subjects. These ten subjects were unanimously enthusiastic about the
value of such a system in general, and about the desirability of the graphical interface as a means to
explore alternative flight amendments:
"I love it. I like the idea of being able to see exactly where that route is on the screen right
in front of me and see where the weather is in relationship to where that airplane is flying."
"This has the advantage of giving you a pictorial view of the alternate routes. I think it
would be very useful. This would certainly make things a lot quicker and easier."
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This is aprettygoodtool. It's basicallyawhat-ifmachine."
"This suredoesspeedup theprocess."
"This is goingto improvetheindustry,bring it a longway."
"Right now atworkwhatwehaveto do is visualizetheroutesandthefixes and compare
them to a separate radar display on a different CRT. I think the overlay system on this
system would be excellent."
"I wouldn't mind having a system like that. It's a nice system. It's more visual."
"It's nice to see the projected movement of the thunderstorms and how that affects your
flight path in the future."
"You can compare on one screen all of the different plans."
"The turbulence reporting is nice."
"It's not a hard program. It's very easy to pick up on."
"At work we have to build a complete flight plan the way we do it. This does it much
quicker."
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'Route Constraints' Subjects. These 9 subjects were similarly positive about the system's
usefulness and underlying design concepts (including the route constraints function, which was
unavailable to the 'sketching only' subjects):
"It's surprisingly sophisticated compared to some flight planning systems I've seen.
Everything is tied together very nicely."
"I think this would be a tremendous improvement over the way that we do it now."
"This is fun. I wish we had this at work."
"This tool would be helpful in training."
"Boy, would I like to have one of these at work. This is incredible. Beautiful."
"It gives you an opportunity to check out what taking immediate action might do versus
waiting until the last minute where you'd have to deviate more than originally planned."
"I like it because it lets you do a lot of what-ifs a lot quicker than you can on a normal
map."
"I like the idea of being able to project the route of flight of an airplane."
"It'd be neat to have a tool like this to draw things out, have the airways right on the
screen."
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'Automatic' Subjects. The 8 dispatchers studied with this version had similar responses:
"This has got to be so complex to build. This is just absolutely phenomenal."
"Having the weather overlaid on jet routes is wonderful. We don't have this yet."
"This would be very useful."
"Since I work a lot of international flights, it'd be nice to have this kind of weather
information available at my desk."
"I like having the route structure available right on the computer, being able to reroute them
like that rather than, right now we take the maps out and start drawing points and then we
type the route into the computer."
"If you presented the same scenarios to me with the system we have in the office we'd be
here another couple of hours."
"It provides a very quick way of comparing fuel bums in circumstances where you would
have multiple routes to select from. The fuel bum feature comes in really handy."
"This is neat. I like this. Most people, they are crises managers. I like to have the attitude
of to have a plan of what we're gonna do if something happens as opposed to waiting for it
to surprise me."
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"This wasdefinitelymuchbetterthanwhatI haveatwork fight now. The ability to put
weatheroverroutesandtheability toput aforecastinandlook aheadis muchbetterthan
what I have."
Subjective Responses-Summary. The evaluation of FPT by dispatchers in their debriefs
leaves little doubt that they perceive that the system would help them to perform tasks that are a
normal part of their current jobs. It is also clear that they feel the underlying design concepts could
provide a very helpful tool.
Such responses, of course, do not tell us how the design features of FPT actually influence
performance. The following objective data, however, provide answers to this question.
Factors Influencing Route Selection.
Given the nature of the data collected (concurrent verbal reports), it is impossible to identify all of
the factors considered by a dispatcher in selecting a particular alternative flight plan in one of our
scenarios (Ericsson and Simon, 1984). At various points in the transcripts, however, there is
evidence of one or more factors being considered.
Below is a composite list of all of the factors so identified. Such a list is potentially valuable to
guide in further system design and evaluation and to help in developing dispatcher training and
testing systems. Many of these factors are interrelated:
°
2.
3.
Fuel consumption as a cost;
Fuel consumption as it relates to fuel reserves (a safety concern);
Arrival time as it relates to the published schedule and to passenger connections;
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4. Turbulence(current;predicted;cause;levelsof uncertaintyassociatewith the
forecast);
5. Thunderstormactivity (current;predicted;cause;levelsof uncertaintyassociated
with theforecast);
6. Passengercomfort;
7. Theavailabilityof alternativesor optionsto dealwithanunexpectedproblemif it
arises(includingalternativeroutesto theplanneddestinationandalternative
destinations);
8. Characteristicsof possiblealternativedestinations(weather;runwayconditions;
closings;air trafficactivity;maintenanceandsupportfacilities);
9. Characteristicsof theplanneddestination(weather;runwayconditions;closings;air
trafficactivity);
10. Air trafficpatternsenrouteandonapproachtothedestination;
11. Preferredalternateroutesby ATC;
12. Approval(or thelikelihoodof approval)of areroutebyATC;
13. Expectationsregardingtheability of thet_ghtcrewandATC to detectanddealwith
minorproblemson theirown whentheyarise(withoutassistancefrom Dispatch);
14. Expectationsregardingthelikely air traffic alongvariousroutesdueto reroutingto
avoidthesamestorm;
15. Windsaloftandtheireffecton fuel consumptionandarrival time;
16. Availability of jet routesorvectors.
This list of factorsitself isnotcomplete- thereareclearlyotherfactorsthatwouldberelevantto
otherscenariosandtherearelikely to befactorsconsideredby dispatchersin ourscenariosthat
simply werenotverbalized.It does,however,serveto suggesthecomplexityof theflight
planningtaskandindicateswhy it is importantto think in termsof cooperativeproblem-solving
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systemsthatsupportthedispatcher,ratherthanautomationto replacethedispatcher.It is clearthat
thecomplexityof this taskis beyondcurrentlyfeasiblemethodsfor designinganautonomous
computerizedproblem-solver.Thelist alsoservesto pointout thatflight planninginvolves
cooperationbetweenseveralparties(ATC, theflight crewandDispatch).
The Influence of System Design on Performance
In our previous study of 30 pilots running in an otherwise identical experiment (Layton, Smith and
McCoy, 1993), we found sizeable effects of system design ('sketching only' vs. 'route
constraints' vs. 'automatic') on performance. In some situations, access to the computer-generated
suggestions improved performance, while in others it impaired performance. Similar analyses are
described below for this study of 27 dispatchers.
Case 1. The following scenario was read to the subjects prior to their working on this case:
"It is summer and you're on a flight from Battleground (Portland) to Northbrook. The
dispatcher gave you a southerly route in order to avoid an occluded front. The front has
dropped to the south as well, however, and has generated some thunderstorms. Time out
was 1700 Zulu and the plane is five minutes into the flight. Decide what you think the
plane should do."
For subjects in the treatment condition in which the computer automatically suggested a solution
upon loading the case, the following two lines were added (prior to "Decide what you think..."):
"The computer has suggested the orange route as an alternative to the original plan (the
green route) based on constraints of no turbulence and no precipitation. You may accept
either of these plans or develop your own."
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Theoriginalroute,(themiddleroute)thecurrentaircraftposition,andthecurrentcompositeradar
for Case1areshownin Figure1. The radar returns show a solid line of thunderstorms with cell
tops at 37,000 feet. (For this experiment, the dispatchers were told the aircraft's maximum altitude
was 33,000 feet.) Furthermore, the gap between the two cells was forecast to close. Therefore, a
deviation was obviously required. The forecast storm movement was to the east, but was very
small.
Case 1 - Hypotheses. The previous study of 30 pilots highlighted three important results:
o
2_
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Because of the large "solution space" (i.e., the large number of possible routes),
pilots in the 'sketching only' version were less likely to find the "best" route in
terms of fuel consumption and time;
Pilots using the 'sketching only' version of the system were influenced to more
carefully consider the uncertainty associated with the storm and consequently
tended to choose a more conservative flight path;
In spite of the problems highlighted in the two points above, all 30 pilots found a
solution that deviated to the north of the storm that was at least satisfactory in terms
of all relevant factors.
Below we contrast the performances of the 27 dispatchers in terms of these previous findings. To
provide a concrete sense of the performances of the subjects, the behaviors of 3 representative
dispatchers are first summarized. Then summary statistics are provided for the entire group.
Case I - Sample Subjects. Below, the performances of three representative subjects (one from
each system version) are described.
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'SketchingOnly' - Subject24. Thisdispatcherfirst lookedatthecurrentcompositeradardisplay
andaskedhimself:
"ShouldI gonorthor shouldI gosouth."
He thenlookedatthecurrentcompositecloudsdisplayandthewinds,checkingthewindsat
differentaltitudes,commenting:
"Looks like moretail windsto thesouthandlessfavorablewindsto thenorth,but the
shorterdistancemaymakeup for it."
He thenlookedatthecurrentcompositeradaragain,zoomingin ontheportionof themapshowing
thestormandsuperimposingthejet routes.He noted:
"The earlierwestartdeviatingthemoremileagewe're goingto save."
Hesketchedaroutefrom BTG to MYL to HIA to BIL to DPRtoRWF to ODI to DLL to BAE to
OBK. (Thisroutestaysfurthernorthof thestormthantherouterecommendedby thecomputerin
theothertwoversionsof thesystem.)
He thenscrolledthroughthespreadsheetfor thisnewroute,saying:
"Now let mescrollfor turbulence."
Checkingtheforecastfor thecompositeradar,hecommented:
"We're northof theweatherandthepilot hastheoptionashegetscloserthatif hewantsto
deviatefurthernorthhecan. If timewasafactor,I'd goaheadandtakethisroutenow,but
westill haveplentyof time."
He thensketchedanotheroutegoingaroundthestormto thesouth,concluding:
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"This usesquiteabit morefuel. About3000poundsmoreandmuchgreaterdistance."
He thereforeselectedtheroutehehadsketchedto thenorthof thestorm.
'RouteConstraints'- Subject4. Thisdispatcherlookedatthecurrentcompositecloudsand
compositeradardisplays,stating:
'Tll seewhatdirectiontheweather'smovingandthengonorthor southof it."
Healsocheckedthecurrentwindsandfrontsandstated:
"I'm gonnago to thesouth."
Beforesketchingarouteto thesouth,however,heoverlaidthejet routesanddecided:
'Tm gonnalet thecomputerpick aroutenowjust to expeditethings."
Hesetconstraintsof no turbulenceandnoprecipitationandlet thecomputerfind aroute,noting:
"The computerwentnorth. I'm gladI did that. It savedmealot of timeif I'd donethat
myselfby lettingthecomputerpick first."
He lookedatthespreadsheetfor thatrouteandcommented:
"Lesstime,morefuel,no turbulence,noprecipitation."
Heconsequentlyimmediatelypickedthecomputer-suggestednortherndeviation. (Notethathedid
notlook at theforecast,andthatthereis noevidencethathethoughtabouttheuncertainty
associatedwith theweatherforecast.)
'Automatic' - Subject11. Thisdispatcherlookedatthecurrentdisplaysfor frontsandradarat
differentaltitudes.Hescrolledthroughthespreadsheetfor theautomaticallysuggestednorthern
deviation,stating:
"Orangeroutelooksgoodasfar astheweather."
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Hedisplayedthejet routesandzoomedin, looking atthecurrentandforecastweatherdisplaysfor
frontsandradar.
"Doesn't look like it's movingtoomuch. Only 10milesanhourto theeast.Goingto the
southdoesn'tlook like it'll saveanytime."
He thendisplayedthewinds,noting(becauseof thetailwindsto thesouth):
"I don't know. It might. Haveto takealook downthere."
Hesketchedarouteto thesouth,but rejectedit:
"That takes45minuteslongerandbumsmorefuel,soI'll stickwith theorangeroute."
Thus,heselectedthecomputer-generatednortherndeviation.
Case I - Route Selection. As in the previous study with 30 pilots, because of the large number of
possible paths, some of the subjects failed to find the most fuel efficient point at which to begin
deviating from the original route to the north. In the study of 30 pilots, 2 of the 10 pilots using the
'sketching only' version failed to find this fuel efficient choice. In this study, 7 of the 10
dispatchers using the 'sketching only' version similarly failed to f'md this fuel efficient choice.
Dispatchers using the 'sketching only' version were, however, much more likely to consider the
uncertainty in the weather forecast than dispatchers using the other two versions. This influence of
the system version used was reflected in both the final route selected and the concurrent verbal
reports. Six of 10 dispatchers using the 'sketching only' version selected a more conservative
northern deviation (as did 6 of 10 pilots in the previous study). None of the 9 dispatchers using
the 'route constraints' version selected a more conservative northern deviation than the computer's
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suggestednortherndeviation. Only one of the 8 subjects using the 'automatic' version picked a
more conservative northern deviation.
This difference in the tendency to closely consider the uncertainty associated with the forecast
(leading to selection of a more conservative northern deviation) was further illustrated by the verbal
reports. Subjects who selected the more conservative deviation made statements like:
"By the time he gets there that might have moved in. Let's stay north a little longer."
"I like this better. I'm willing to spend a little extra money to give him that cushion. If by
chance the frontal system shifts a little, I'm giving him a little room to fire proof his buns."
Subjects who were influenced by the computer's suggestion, however, typically made statements
that failed to reveal any consideration of the uncertainty associated with the forecast:
"All the info I have available suggests the computer has selected the best route, with not
only no significant precipitation, no turbulence, but the time enroute, fuel bum and
everything is better."
In spite of these differences in performance, though, 26 of the 27 dispatchers selected some
northern deviation that was certainly satisfactory, and the one who selected a southern deviation
also picked an acceptable route.
Case 1 - Differences in Mental Models. There was one dispatcher who chose to deviate south even
though he looked at a northern deviation. The most interesting insight provided by his data was
the very significant difference in his model of the weather situation compared to the models of the
dispatchers who deviated north:
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"If you runhimnorthinto thelow, I suspectyou'd getturbulencealoft. If yourun him
southof thefront, thepossibilitythereis thatthethunderstormswouldextend
southwestwardasyoutry toroutehimaroundit. But thecold front in thiscaseis small,so
probablyin thiscaseI wouldelectto routetheflight aroundthesouthend."
Thisassessmentof thesituationcontrastswith thatof thedispatcherswho deviatednorth:
"South. This is acrummyroute."
"Given theseasonof theyear, I don't think its going to build to the north. I think it's
going to build in the south more."
"Going to the south side, the thing already has a history of sliding south, so you may run
into the same problem a second time. You don't want to do that."
Case 1 - Differences in Information Seela'ng. The study of 30 pilots found no significant
differences in displays viewed across the different system versions for Case 1. This study found
similar results, as shown in Table 1. The table indicates, for instance, that 10 of 10 subjects using
the 'sketching only' version looked at the radar weather.
Table 1. Information Viewed in Case 1
Radar Fronts Winds Clouds .let Routes
'Sketching Only' 10/10 8/10 6/10 3/10 10/10
'Route Constraints' 9/9 9/9 3/9 4/9 8/9
'Automatic' 8/8 6/8 7/8 3/8 8/8
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Case I - Other Interesting Behaviors. As discussed earlier in general terms, there are a number of
factors that should be considered in evaluating an alternative flight plan. It is interesting to note
that only 2 of the 27 dispatchers showed any verbal evidence of considering one important factor,
air traffic patterns:
"I'm going to try to go around it to the north, mainly because of the traffic flows out of
O'Hare."
"You're bringing them into Chicago from the north. That's usually good from the west
side, rather than bringing them in from the south. They get a lot of traffic from the south."
In addition, it is interesting m note the way in which some dispatchers explicitly viewed the _ght
crew as a resource to detect problems and make modifications to a plan as necessary when new
data becomes available:
"I would remind the crew to contact me when he gets just in the vicinity of Billings to
evaluate whether he needs to go a little further north."
Finally, two dispatchers described interactions with flight crews or ATC:
"That's actually where I've had arguments with pilots [about the desirability of spending "a
little extra money to give him that cushion"]. They're willing to do this [cut closer to the
predicted storm activity]. When I tell them what it'll cost I normally can get them to agree."
"The way it's supposed to work, the captain, if he's given a reroute by ATC or if he wants
to go a different way, he's supposed to call us and let us analyze it. If we notice, like in
this case, like a line of thunderstorms along the planned route of flight, we'll either get a
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hold of themearlieror,yeah,that'swhatwegottado,wegottagetaholdof themasearly
aswecanto try andchangethingsaround,let themwarnATC asfar in advanceasthey
can. A lot of timesATC will startdoingit beforewegetachanceto getaholdof them
'causetheyjust startflowing stuff aroundtoo."
Case I - Summary. The results of this study for Case 1 were very consistent with those of the
previous study with 30 pilots. First, it illustrated the potential value of the computer as a tool to
identify fuel- and time-efficient routes around bad weather. Even with the graphical interface,
dispatchers frequently had difficulty identifying the most fuel-efficient point at which to start
deviating from the original route.
Second, although the use of the computer to generate fuel-efficient deviations was beneficial to
overall performance, there was again strong evidence that such computer-generated suggestions
also had a potentially detrimental effect:
Dispatchers who first viewed the computer's suggested deviation were much less likely to
consider the uncertainty associated with the forecast than those dispatchers who had to
sketch their own routes. The graphical interface for sketching new routes tended to cause
the dispatchers using the 'sketching only' version to look more closely at the weather, to
consider the uncertainty associated with the forecast, and to consider its relationship to the
alternative paths available.
Nevertheless, in Case 1 all of the dispatchers generated plans that were at least satisfactory.
Another interesting insight provided by the data from Case 1 was the very significant differences in
the "mental models" that different dispatchers developed regarding the weather situation, and in the
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differentfactorsthatthedispatchersconsidered(suchasair trafficpatterns).Theseindividual
differenceshaveimplicationsfor thetrainingof dispatchers.
Finally,Case1providedhintsregardingdifferent"models"of cooperationamongdispatchers,
flight crewsandATC. Thedataindicatethat,becauseof theirdifferentgoalsandroles,
informationsources,workloadsandresources,all threepartiesplay apart in thedetectionof
problemsandin identifyingpotentialsolutions.
Case2. Case2 wasdesignedsothatthereweretwo initially plausibledirectionsfor deviating
(northor southof a storm).Thescenarioconsistedof thefollowing:
"It's summerandtheplaneis eightminutesinto aflight from OaklandtoJoliet. You got
off thegroundat 1600Zulu. Younoticethatthereisasolid line of convective
thunderstorms directly in your path. Decide what you think the plane should do."
Figure 5 shows the weather for this case.
Case 2 - Hypotheses. Case 2 was designed so that the preferability of a northern or southern
deviation around the storm was not immediately obvious. Consequently, the choice made was
rather sensitive to the specific data viewed and the dispatcher's mental model of the situation.
In particular, our previous study of 30 pilots suggested:
1. Because of the moderately large "data space" (i.e., the fairly large number of
choices of data to select from for viewing), some individuals are likely to miss
important data (winds, forecast radar weather, or turbulence);
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There are likely to be significant differences in the mental models of the weather
developed by different individuals;
Because of Points 1 and 2 above, there are likely to be disagreements in deciding
whether to deviate north or south of the storm;
Access to the computer's suggestion (a northern deviation) is likely to significantly
bias situation assessment, leading more people using the 'route constraints' and
'automatic' versions to select a northern deviation.
Case 2 - Sample Subjects. The performances of three representative subjects are described below.
'Sketching Only' - Subject 26. This dispatcher looked at the current displays for composite clouds
and, composite radar and looked at current radar and winds at different altitudes, commenting:
"I guess that's just summertime activity over the Rockies. Some people might want to try
to thread through there but to me that's not a good idea."
He then displayed the jet routes and turned the winds off to:
"get rid of a little clutter."
He zoomed in on the storm, scrolled along the original route on the spreadsheet to look at
turbulence and winds, and then sketched a route south of the storms, noting:
"8000 pounds, which would be plenty."
He again scrolled along the spreadsheet looking at turbulence and winds, this time for his southern
deviation, observing that there was a:
"change from a headwind to a tailwind."
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Hesketchedanotherdeviation,this timeto thenorthof thestorms,concluding:
"We savedabout1000poundsbycomingthenorthernroutethanthesouthernroute."
He lookedatthecurrentwindsagainanddecided:
"We shouldn'thaveto worry abouthavingit drift northintoour route."
Notethatheneverlookedattheweatherforecaston themap. Heconsequentlyselectedthe
northerndeviation.
'RouteConstraints'- Subject14. Thissubjectbeganby lookingatthecurrentcompositeradar,
compositecloudsandfronts,scrolledalongthespreadsheetlookingat turbulencealongtheoriginal
route,andlookedatthecurrentandforecastradaratdifferentaltitudes,stating:
"At thispointI'd beleaningtowardsarerouteto thesouth."
Hezoomedin, turnedonthejet routes,andaskedthecomputerto find aroutewith noturbulence
orprecipitation.He thenscrolledalongthespreadsheetor thecomputer-suggestednorthern
deviation.
At thatpointhemovedbackandforthbetweenthecurrentandforecastradarweatherto:
"takealookat theprojectedmovement."
Hesubsequentlysketcheda southerndeviation,rejectingit butcommenting:
"The southernrouteisusingmorefuelandtimethanthecomputer-projectedroute. The
concernon this [thecomputer'ssuggestion]wouldbethattheroute,thatlookslike the
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weatheris actuallybuildingto thenorthmorethanit is to thesouth,andbeforeI'd select
thenorthernroute,I'd wantto look atwhatthedeviationwouldbeif I hadto gofurther
northto avoidapossiblecontinuedbuildupin theSouixFallsarea."
He thereforesketchedamoreconservativenortherndeviation,checkedthefuel consumptionand
said:
"I probablyopt for thecomputer-generatedroute,theorangeone,knowingI coulddeviate
furthernorthandstill makethecompletionof thetrip."
'Automatic' - Subject2. Thisdispatcherviewedthecompositecloudsandradar,saying:
"There'ssomegoodactivity in there. I don't seeanyrealholes."
He lookedattheforecastandconcludedthey:
"can't gooverit."
Heobservedthatthecomputer-suggestednortherndeviation:
"Costsmeathousandpoundsin fuel,about8 minutes.Well within anysortof limitations
I havefor theairplane."
He lookedat thewindsandcommented:
"The windsto thesouthdon't look good,"
andscrolledalongthespreadsheetfor thecomputer-suggestedroute,noting:
"That's atotallycleanrouteaccordingto thecomputerasfar asturbulenceandweather."
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He concluded:
"I don't seeanyreasonnot todo thecomputer-generatedroute."
Case 2 - Route Selection. In the previous study of 30 pilots, 6 of 10 using the 'sketching only'
version went north and 4 went south; 9 of 10 using the 'route constraints' version went north and
one went south; and all ten using the automatic version went north. The data for the 27 dispatchers
are very similar. Of the 10 'sketching only' subjects, 7 went north and 3 went south; of the 9
'route constraints' subjects, 6 went north, 2 went south and one decided to weave through the
storms. All 8 of the 'automatic' subjects deviated north.
These results leave little doubt that, in spite of the fact that all of these subjects had potential access
to the same data, the way in which the computer supported them in generating alternative routes
had a very powerful influence on their situation assessments.
Differences in Mental Models. There were very significant difference in the models of the weather
developed by the different dispatchers:
"Going south isn't going to do anything for me but give me headwinds."
"In the summertime if this thing starts to build it will build faster to the south than to the
north. Trying to go south could be a sucker hole. I don't see a lot of weather potential to
the north of the severe weather. A friend of mine got suckered that way and he went south
and the line just beat him. It just built faster than he could get there. These sometimes can
build up really fast and it went south on him and it just ate him alive. The airplane just flew
forever. The reserves - there weren't any. They ate a lot of reserves."
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"Thereshouldbevery little furtherdevelopmentsouth. If thereis, it's nothingthathecan't
scootbyprettyquick."
An interestinghypothesisis thatviewingthecomputer'ssuggestednortherndeviationcausedthe
subjectsin the 'routeconstraints'and'automatic'versionsto look for justificationsfor sucha
northerndeviation,thuschangingtheirdatacollectionprocessandtheirresultantmentalmodels.
Thisraisesinterestingpossibilitiesthatcognitivebiasessimilarto aconfirmationbiasorbiased
assimulationareinducedby viewingthecomputer'ssuggestion(Fraser,SmithandSmith,1992).
Case 2 - Differences in Information Seeking. Table 2 indicates the numbers of dispatchers who
looked at the different classes of map displays available. Of particular significance is the fact that 3
of the 10 dispatchers in the 'sketching only' version never looked at the winds, one factor arguing
against the southern route:
"The more north we go the better winds we're gorma get. South we're going to be in a
headwind situation."
Table 2. Information Viewed in Case 2
Radar Fronts Winds Clouds .let Routes
'Sketching Only' 10/10 8/10 7/10 3/10 9/10
'Route Constraints' 9/9 7/9 6/9 4/9 7/9
'Automatic' 8/8 4/8 6/8 5/8 5/8
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Equallyinteresting,2 of 10subjectsusingthe 'sketchingonly' versiondid not look atthe
turbulencedataonthespreadsheetfor their southernroutes. If theyhaddoneso,theywouldhave
discoveredmoderateturbulencealongtheirplanneddeviation.
Finally,it is interestingto notethata sizeablenumberof thedispatchersneverlookedatthe
forecastweather( 7/10in the 'sketchingonly', 6/9 in the 'routeconstraints'and7/8 in the
"automatic'version). Indeed,thedispatcherin the 'routeconstraints'versionwho choseapoor
solution,lettingtheplaneweavethroughthestorm,wasoneof thesesubjects.In thedebriefhe
notedhispoorselectionandblamedit onhisfailureto look attheforecast:
"I forgot themostusefultoolwhich is movingthem[movingthedisplaysforwardin
time]."
(Healsochosenot to usetherouteconstraintsfunctionandhenceneversawthecomputer's
recommendation.)
Case 2 - Other Interesting Behaviors. The data again showed clear examples of other
considerations:
"I tend to think in terms of where I've got support, where I can put this airplane if
something goes wrong."
"This may be closer to the thunderstorm than I like, but again here we have a situation
when the crew gets close, if they decide they want to deviate further they can."
In addition, some dispatchers used the system to work out in detail certain what-if situations:
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"I'd selecttheorangeroute[thecomputer-suggestednortherndeviation]with theblueroute
[a moreconservativenortherndeviationsketchedby thedispatcher]asanalternate.
Checkingthefuelburnsit's only,thedifferencebetweentheorangeandtheblueroutesis
only adifferenceof 3minutesand400pounds.SoI'd havehim fly theorangerouteand
givehim theinfo to fly thebluerouteif thatwasnecessarylater."
As a lastexample,consideronedispatcher'sview of thejob:
"The orangeroute[thecomputer-suggestednortherndeviation]wastheoriginal reroute.
That'scool! I got it by 1minute[with aroutethedispatcherhadjust sketched].This is
what I dowith my flight planningcomputeratwork. I playchesswith it. [Then,after
scrollingthroughtheturbulencedisplayon thespreadsheetfor thesketchedroute:] Argh!
Stabbed!Well, I beatit by 1minutebut it's showingmoderateturbulenceonmy route."
Case 2 - Summary. Like Case 1, the major results for the 27 dispatchers in Case 2 were very
similar to those for the 30 pilots in the previous study. There were clearly problems with some
dispatchers failing to look at important data at the right time; there were major differences in the
mental models of the situation developed by different dispatchers; and the system version used had
a very sizeable influence on the selection of an alternate route. Perhaps the most interesting insight
inspired by this data is a possible explanation for the effect of viewing the computer-generated
suggestion:
Having seen the computer's recommendation, some dispatchers may be influenced to look
for data and explanations that justify the computer's suggestion. This may lead to the
development of a different mental model of the situation.
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Case3. Case3 wasdesignedto presenthesubjectswith adifficult planningproblemandto put
thevarioussystemdesignsto ademandingtest. Unlike thepreviouscases,thethunderstormsin
Case3 werenot localizedandtheir topswerenotall atthesamealtitude. Like Case2, therewere
twolikely directionsfor deviating,but in thiscaseneitherwaswithoutpotentialproblems.In
particular,adeviationthatavoidedstormsatthebeginningof theroutehadto passthroughmore
severestormslater. Finally,flight safetywasabiggerconcernon thiscasethantheprevious
cases.
Description of the Case. The following scenario was read to the subjects prior to their
working on the case:
"It's summer and the plane is on a flight from Cheyenne to San Antonio. The plane got off
the ground at 1900 Zulu and are now two minutes into the flight. Decide what you think
the plane should do."
The original route, the current aircraft position, and the current composite radar are shown in
Figure 6. The current radar shows a number of thunderstorm cells with tops ranging from 28,000
to 43,000 feet, but the aircraft's maximum altitude was 33,000 feet. One of the cells directly on
the flight path had a top of 43,000 feet. The forecast radar showed that the cells were predicted to
move north and slightly east.
In summary, Case 3 presented subjects with a rather complex planning problem. The weather was
dispersed over a large area and was changing somewhat unpredictably. This scenario required that
the dispatchers anticipate various possible outcomes and plan accordingly. The routes suggested
by the computer in the 'route constraints and sketching' and 'automatic route .constraints, route
constraints, and sketching' conditions are shown in Figure 6. There were two routes suggested by
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thecomputer,dependingupontheconstraintsplacedonit. Constraintsof noturbulenceandno
precipitationcausedthecomputerto suggesttheeasternroute(hereaftereferredto asthe 'eastern'
route). Constraintsthatallowedlight turbulenceandprecipitationcausedthecomputerto suggest
thewesternroute(hereaftereferredto asthe 'western'route). In the 'automaticrouteconstraints,
routeconstraints,andsketching'treatmentcondition,thecomputerautomaticallysuggestedthe
eastern route to the subjects. These subjects had to modify the constraints on the computer or
sketch their own route in order to come up with a western route.
Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here
The' eastern route' passed between two large, severe thunderstorm cells. Summer thunderstorms
in Texas are notorious for their volatility and it was very possible that the two cells on either side of
the 'eastern route' would grow and build together. Furthermore, the 'eastern route' passed
extremely close to a forecast intense cell location.
Case 3 - Hypotheses. In both Cases 1 and 2, the version of FPT used by pilots in our previous
study and by dispatchers in this study had a sizeable influence on the cognitive processes involved
in selecting an alternative flight plan, and on the route selected. Nevertheless, all of the pilots and
dispatchers ultimately selected routes that were at least satisfactory for Cases 1 and 2.
In Case 3, we selected a scenario (based on actual weather data provided by the National Center for
Atmospheric Research) where the computer's suggestion was very poor.
Our previous study of the 30 pilots on Case 3 supported five hypotheses:
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Planners using the 'route constraints' and 'automatic' versions are much more
likely to select the computer's recommended solution which deviates to the east of
the original flight path (a poor solution). This selection of a poor solution is in part
due to a failure to consider the uncertainty associated with the weather forecast
(something the computer similarly fails to consider);
Because of the large "solution space", planners using the 'sketching only' version
are likely to often generate inefficient solutions (in terms of fuel and time);
Because of the large "data space", planners may fail to note important data
(turbulence information and radar forecasts) or become "disoriented", failing to
realize which weather display (current vs. forecast weather) they are looking at.
When a planner uses a short planning horizon to sketch a plan (making choices one
segment at a time and not reconsidering previous choices), the result may be a
sketched route similar to the computer's suggested eastern deviation (the poor
route).
Using an eliminations by aspects strategy, planners using the 'mute constraints'
and 'automatic' version may eliminate the 'western route' because of the predicted
turbulence along the end of the flight and select the 'eastern route', even though in
terms of a global evaluation it is clearly inferior.
Case 3 - Sample Subjects. Three representative subjects (dispatchers) are described in detail
below.
'Sketching Only' - Subject 6. To begin, this subject looked at the curent and forecast weather,
checking the composite radar and clouds and the fronts. He concluded:
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"This stuff isprettystationary,if anythingdrifting alittle bit north. Someprettyhotcells,
up to 43,000 right along the route. That's the wrong place to be. This is a pretty bad
bunch of weather here."
Hen then sketched a far western deviation from DEN to HBU to FMN to ABQ to CNX to ROW to
INK to ABI to SAT. While doing so he commented:
'Tm just gonna circumnavigate this whole area. It's too nasty a weather system to be
playing with. I'm gonna stay on the backside of this stuff."
He also noted that:
"That route adds considerable time and bum, but it's too crummy to get foolish here. I just
don't like that weather pattern. That thing is building and developing. This is definitely
bad news. I juist have to eat it, add an extra half hour to the flight time."
Noting that he "could be cutting it a little bit fine here [in terms of fuel]" he then modified his far
western route to fly more directly from INK to SAT (flying from INK to JCT to SAT instead of
from INK to ABI to SAT). He checked the spreadsheet for turbulence along this new route,
commenting:
"It's gonna hit some turbulence on the descent but there's not a whole lot to do about that."
In the end, however, he decided that:
"Based on getting a smoother ride, I'd have to pick the slightly longer route [his initial far
western deviation]".
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'RouteContraints'- Subject16. Thisdispatcherlookedatthefrontsandweatheradarfor the
currentweatherandthenaskedthecomputerto findaroutewithno turbulenceorprecipitation.
Thecomputergeneratedthe 'easternroute' for whichthedispatchernoted:
"The fuelburnisup about1700pounds.We're outof theturbulenceandwe'reout of the
thunderstormactivity.... I'd saythat lookslike agoodroute.... The passengerswill be
comfortableandit lookslike agoodsafeflight."
In thedebrief,however,whenhewasshownboththecomputer-generatedsuggestionsfor
avoidingthestorm(onewestof thestormandtheother- whichhehadselected- eastof thestorm)
andwasshownall of therelevantweatherdata,hecompletelychangedhisopinion:
"I shouldhavegonewith theotherone[thecomputer-suggestedwesterndeviation]. I
forgotabouttheforecasLThefuel's not thatmuchdifferentandit definitely keepsyou
awayfrom all thethunderstormactivity.... Pleasebumthis tape."
'Automatic' - Subject9. Thisdispatcherfirst lookedatthecompositeradarfor thecurrent
weather,commenting:
"What amess! Thegreen[current]routestinks."
He thenlookedat theradardisplaysfor thecurrentweatheratdifferentaltitudes.Statingthathe
wantedto "seewheretheweatheris moving",hedisplayedthecompositeradarandcomposite
cloudsandlookedathow theychangedfrom thecurrentto forecastweatherdisplays.His
evaluationatthispointwasthat:
"It's reallyhardto seemovement.Lookslike theorangeone[thecomputer'ssuggested
routethatwoundaroundthroughgapsin thestormto theeastof theoriginalroute] is not
perfecteither."
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This dispatcherthensketchedarouteof hisownthatwaswestof themajorstormactivity,stating:
"Let meseeif there'saway to getaroundit. Usuallytheweathermovesfrom westtoeast,
somaybeI couldcomearoundthebackside."
Hesketchedaroutefrom DEV to PUBtoLVS to TCCto ROW to INK to JCTto SAT(seeFigure
7), commenting:
"I wouldn't wantto beonthis airplane,butwe'll try it."
Thedispatcherthenscrolledalongthespreadsheetto look atthepredictedturbulenceandnoted:
"There'sturbulenceonthedescent"
for thisnewlysketchedroute. Heconsequentlyraisedthealtitudefor thelasttwo legsof theflight
(sinceonly light chopwasreportedatthis higheraltitude,asopposedto moderateturbulenceat
loweraltitudes).
Finally, thisdispatchercomparedthetwoalternativeroutesunderconsideration(thecomputer
suggestedeviationeastof theoriginalroutevs.hisownroutesketchedwestof theoriginal route)
andobserved:
"My routeisnot toomuchfurther. A little bit longeranda little lessfuel [remainingatthe
destination],andthey'regoingto usemorefuel to deviateattheend[to avoidorreducethe
turbulence].Personally,I thinkmy pink routeis abetterbecauseI'm behindtheweather
for mostof theway. I'd takethepink routeandlet him [thepilot] deviateattheend."
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Case 3 - Route Selection. There was considerable variability in the plans selected by the 10
dispatchers in the 'sketching only' version. One elected to land early at Amarillo; one made a
minor deviation further east at the beginning of the flight (to avoid a perceived problem with the
storm activity west of that part of the flight plan), and then followed the original route; three
deviated further west than the 'western route' (one of these also made a jog east of the 'western
route' at the end of the flight (see Figures 6 and 7); five sketched and selected the 'western route'.
Of the four subjects who deviated west of the 'western route', all agreed in the debrief (after being
shown the 'western route' and all of the data) that this was an unnecessary extra deviation that was
wasteful in terms of time and fuel. Like the results in Case 1, this illustrates the problems caused
by the large "solution space" that has to be searched when sketching a plan.
Two of the 10 'sketching only' subjects did not look at the turbulence display on the spreadsheet,
another illustration of the problems with having too large a "data space" (too many data displays to
select from). One of these subjects commented in the debrief:
"It really bothers me that I missed that moderate turbulence over there. Damm."
Of those that did look at the turbulencc display, one chose to deviate further east for the last part of
the flight (see Figure 7), while the others decided:
"We're going to have moderate turbulence all the way down through there. Should pose
no problem for the aircraft other than a little bit of a bumpy ride".
and noted:
"Sometimes there is no right answer. With this weather situation, if you can't avoid the
whole thing. You have to rely on the pilot to pick his way through."
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Of the9 dispatchersusingthe 'routeconstraints'version,five selectedthe 'westernroute', one
stayedon theoriginal route,two chosethecomputer-suggested'easternroute'andoneslightly
modifiedthecoputer-suggested'easternroute' to fly evenfurthereastatthebeginningof theflight.
As with thestudyof 30pilots,dispatcherswhofirst generatedthecomputer'ssuggested'eastern
route'by selectingconstraintsof no turbulenceandnoprecipitationwerestronglyinfluencedto
selectthatroute. Indeed,afinergrainedanalysisshowsthat,of the 10pilotsin thepreviousstudy
whousedthe 'routeconstraints'version,3 first generatedthe 'easternroute'usingtheroute
constraintsfunction,andof these3 twoselectedthe 'easternroute'. Similarly,of the9dispatchers
in the 'sketchingonly' condition,4 first generatedthe 'easterndeviation' usingtheroutecostraints
function,and3 of theseselectedthe 'easternroute'.
It is interestingto alsonotethatthedispatcherwhomodifiedthecomputer-suggested'eastern
route' to fly evenfurthereastat thebeginningof theflight wasinfluencedby lookingatan
inappropriatedisplay. Heshouldhavebeenlookingat thecurrentradarweather.Instead(and
apparentlywithoutbeingawareof it), hewaslooking attheforecast,whichwasfor atimeperiod
wheretheplanewouldbewell beyondthepontwherehemadehiseasterndeviation.This isan
exampleof the"disorientation"describedearlier.
Finally, of theeightsubjectsusingthe 'automatic'version,all 8 deviatedwestof thestorm(6
followedthe 'westernroute';2 addedafurtherdeviationwestatthebeginningof the 'western
route').
It is interestingthatall 8 of thesesubjectslookedatthecomputer'sautomaticallysuggested'eastern
route'andhadimmediateresponseslike:
42
"I don't like goingthroughwhatlookslike,whattheorangeroute [computer-suggested
'eastern route'] is doing, picked a hole in the front. Summer time this stuff can be pretty
volatile. It's liable to keep generating into a solid line."
"The route that the computer has selected is going to put the crew into the middle of a box.
Once they arrive in this area they have no options."
They all consequently generated and selected a western deviation, even though they noted the
turbulence along the end of that route:
"Let's keep it up at 330 until we get past Wink [to minimize exposure to the turbulence].
There's not any way to avoid this stuff on descent down to San Antonio."
This contrasts with the performances of the 10 pilots in the previous study who used the
'automatic' version. Four of those 10 subjects selected the computer's suggested 'eastern route'
even though they looked at an alternative' western route'. (The 'western route' was rejected by
those subjects because of the turbulence toward the end of the flight.)
Case 3 - Differences in Mental Models and Situation Assessment.. As in Case 2, there were major
differenc in the weather models and situation assessments by different dispatchers. All of them in
the debrief concluded that the 'eastern route' was less desirable. Just how undesirable that route,
and the original route were, however, varied widely.
One dispatcher selected the original route and felt it was the best even in the debrief. This contrasts
with assessments by other dispatchers like:
"They're showing tops at 43,000 which means we're going to have to go around it."
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"The greenroute[theoriginalroute] stinks."
Differences in evaluations of the 'eastern route' were even more interesting:
"Probably gonna want to come around the back side of this stuff 'cause its moving slowly
east."
"I wouldn't even attempt to take him around the east side because he'd have to go directly
into that front activity and since that area's moving west to east."
"I don't like the easterly route because if I get pinched off and the line fills I really don't
have a good alternate choice other than going back up to Amarillo."
"Although it looks like there should be a pretty good hole, my general feeling would be that
I would not trust that. Down the road that far you could get caught in this line of
thunderstorms, as it looks like it could very well form together."
"My thoughts remind me of the Southern crash, and I know just a little bit about that. That
area is very susceptible, doesn't give you much space in that particular area to go through
those red, and what I call the red zone, and I have no desire to go through that and
knowing that could fill in no time at all. That almost looks like that could be a front
although its not indicated. Your're going to develop hail probably in that area and so forth
which specifically could give you severe danger in that area."
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"That [thecomputer-suggested'easternroute'] isaprettygoodroute. I don't haveany
problemwith that."
"Therearefour areasof severethunderstormactivity. It's whatI'd still call scatteredto
widelyscattered."
In addition, onedispatcher(in contrasto the other 26 dispatchers and 30 pilots), thought the
weather was so bad he should just land:
"Do I want to land at Amarillo and wait this out? Basing it strictly on safety, that would be
my decision."
Case 3 - Differences in Information Seeking- As shown in Table 3 there were no clear
differences in the information viewed by subjects using the three system versions.
Table 3. Information Viewed in Case 3
Radar Fronts Winds Clouds JyARoutes
'Sketching Only' 10/10 9/10 8/10 2/10 10/10
'Route Constraints' 9/9 8/9 6/9 4/9 6/9
'Automatic' 8/8 5/8 5/8 0/8 8/8
Case 3 - Summary. Many of the results in Case 3 were consistent with those from the previous
study of 30 pilots. There was evidence that dispatchers in the 'sketching only' version had some
difficulties with the large "solution space", resulting in routes that were less efficient in terms of
fuel and time, and there was evidence of "disorientation" where dispatchers were looking at the
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forecastweatherto plantheflight atpointswherethecurrentweatherdisplaywasmoreappropriate
(or viceversa).
Similarly,asignificantnumberof dispatchers(3of the27)selectedtheclearly inferior 'eastern
route' (comparedto 8 of 30pilots whodid soin thepreviousstudy). Theresultsfurthersupport
theconclusionthat,throughvariousmechanisms,thecomputer'ssuggested'easterndeviation'
influencedsomedispatchersundesirably.
In termsof this influence,it is interestingto note:
1. Noneof thedispatcherswhosawboththe 'eastern'and'western'routesselected
thepoor 'easternroute'. Thethreewhodid choosethepoorrouteneverexplored
thewesternalternative.Thiscontrastswith manyof thepilotswho selectedthe
computer-suggested'easternroute'eventhoughtheylookedat the 'westernroute';
2. Thedataaresuggestivethatsubjectsin the 'routeconstraints'conditionwho
viewedthe 'easternroute'weremorelikely to selecthatroutethansubjectsin the
'automatic'versionwhoviewedthesamecomputer-generatedsuggestion;
3. Subjectsusingthe 'sketchingonly' versionweremuchlesslikely to selectapoor
easterndeviation(only 1of 10pilots and0 of 10dispatcherselectedaneastern
deviation).
Case4. Case4 presentedsubjectswith a situationin which theshortestandmostfuel-efficient
deviation,north,requiredthepilotsto violateoneof their standardheuristics(fly upwindof
thunderstorms).Thestormin thiscasecouldalsobetopp_, althoughthatwouldhaveput the
planein turbulenceabovethestorm. Furthermore,therewassomerisk of thestormgrowing
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quickly. As in theprevioustwo cases,thereweretwo likely directionsfor deviating;in thiscase
thosedirectionswerenorthandsouthof thestorm.
Thefollowing scenariowasreadto thesubjectsprior totheirworkingon thecase:"Theplaneis
onaflight from Albuquerqueto New Orleans.It gotoff thegroundat 1400Zulu. It isnow 19
minutesinto theflight andyou'venoticedathunderstormcell outsideof Dallas. Decidewhatyou
think theplaneshoulddo."
Theoriginal route,thecurrentaircraftposition,andthecurrentcompositeradarareshownin
Figure8 alongwith thelikely deviationsnorthandsouthof thestorm.Theforecastweather
showedthestormmovingslowly to thenortheast.
Case 4 - Hypotheses. Case 4 is primarily of interest as an opportunity to look at individual
differences in situation assessment. The "solution space" is much smaller than for the first three
cases, which is likely to reduce the impact of the effects of seeing the computer's suggestion on
plan selection. What is of interest is the fact that, as stated above, there is a conflict between
different criteria for selecting a route.
Case 4 - Route Selection.. There were three classes of solutions available, deviating north or south
of the storm or staying on the original route (vectoring around the storm as necessary). Table 4
shows the selections made by the 30 pilots in the previous study. Table 5 shows the results for the
dispatchers in this study.
Table 4. Route Selections bv Pilots
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North South 9.r.igiaal
'Sketching Only' 5/10 4/10 1/10
'Route Constraints' 5/10 4/10 1/10
'Automatic' 7/10 2/10 1/10
Table 5. Route Selections bv Disnatchers
North South D.r2giaat
'Sketching Only' 4/10 5/10 1/10
'Route Constraints' 4/9 3/9 2/9
'Automatic' 0/8 7/8 1/8
The most interesting finding is again that there are sizeable individual dissferences in situation
assessment and subsequent selection of a route. These differences will be explored in more detail
in the next subsection. It is also interesting to note that the dispatchers using the 'automatic"
version had a much stronger preference for the southern deviation.
Mental Models and Situation Assessment.. As the quotes below illustrate, there were very strong
differences in the evaluation of the situation by different dispatchers.
"Even though it looks like I can get over it, I think I would elect to look at some options
here because I don't know, this thing could develop and mushroom and continue to climb."
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"I wouldgowith thepink route[northerndeviation]at this timedueto thecomputertelling
methatthere'sno turbulencceat thataltitude,at 33,000,andthefuel consumptionispretty
muchnegligible."
"I'd pick thenortherlyroute. Eventhoughthethunderstormis headingin thatdirection,
he'll still avoidit andit isshorterthanthesoutherlyroute."
"As far asfuel to destinationanddistance,thenortherndeviationwouldbeshorter."
"North. There'snopoint. Thestuff is travelingnorth."
"Basedon themovementof theconvectiveactivity I wouldprobablyrecommendthe
southerlyroute."
"With asinglecell movingat 15knots,hecancircumnavigatethecell. I seenoreasonto
wasteathousandpoundsof fuel for adeviation."
"I would tell him thatturbulencehasbeenreportedin thevicinity of aseverethunderstorm,
anisolatedseverethunderstormthat'sin progressjust westof DFW. If hewentanother
20-30milesoff his course,hewouldprobablyminimizehis fuelburn,getthesame
handlingfrom ATC andminimizethedelayon theflight. He turnstheseatbeltsignon,he
startsa little bit to thesouth."
"Dallastraffic is notgoingto beamajorconsideration."
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"Coming downthesouthernroute you're gonna stay out of ATC's way too."
Two points are worth noting:
1. Only 3 of the dispatchers showed evidence of considering air traffic concerns.
2. Although we are not in a position to determine which of the alternative solutions
is best, they can't all be. Hence, there is a need for better gaining to ensure that
dispatchers correctly assess the weather situation and consider all of the relevant
factors in selecting a route.
Case 4 - Differences in Information Seeking - As shown in Table 6 there were no clear
differences in the information viewed by subjects using the three system versions.
Table 6. Information Viewed in Case 6
Radar Fronts Winds Clouds .Iet Routes
'Sketching Only' 10/10 8/10 5/10 3/10 10/10
'Route Constraints' 9/9 4/9 6/9 4/9 6/9
'Automatic' 8/8 5/8 7/8 5/8 8/8
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This study, when combined with the results of our previous study of 30 airline pilots, leaves little
doubt that the introduction of computer-generated suggestions for solving a flight planning
problem can have a marked impact on the cognitive processes of the user and on the ultimate plan
selected. In some cases, this impact is beneficial. If the computer' s model of the "world" is
adequate for a particular scenario, the best route is more likely to be identified with the computer's
assistance. In other cases, however, the computer's suggestion can have a profound adverse
impact. When the computer makes a poor suggestion (because its model of the "world" is
inadequate or because it doesn't adequately consider all of the relevant factors), sizeable numbers
of users are likely to be induced to accept this poor plan.
The exact mechanisms by which such a negative influence is exerted merits further investigation.
This study does, however, serve to identify some of the processes involved. First, some planners
are overreliant in a very straightforward way: They accept the computer's recommendation
without seriously evaluating it. The performances of only 1 of the 7 pilots and 1 of the 3
dispatchers who selected the poor 'eastern route' in Case 3 after seeing the computer's suggestion
can be accounted for by this explanation, though. The remainder selected a poor solution in spite
of considerable efforts at evaluation. For these latter subjects, a major contributor to their failure
appeared to be a failure to consider the limitations of the computer's model of the "world". They
got drawn into the computer's "world", which did not take uncertainty in the weather into account,
and consequently did not reason about the impact of this uncertainty on the desirability of the
computer's suggested "eastern route' in Case 3. (The results in Cases 1 and 2 were also very
consistent with this latter explanation, although the routes selected were much more satisfactory
because the computer's model of the "world" was adequate for those cases.)
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In additionto theseproblemsincopingwith thelarge"solutionspaces"thatmustbesearched,and
with thebiasingeffectsof viewing thecomputer'ssuggestion,therewereproblemswith thelarge
"dataspace"to beconsidered.Manyof thedispatchersfailedto view valuableinformationat
appropriatetimes. Systemdesignersmustthereforebeveryconcernedwith providingaccessto
toomuchinformation,asthis increasesthechancesthatimportantdatawill beoverlooked.The
useof integrateddatadisplaysthatcombineall relevantdataonasingledisplayshouldalsobe
seriouslyconsidered(theproblembeingthatrelevancedependsonthesituation),asshouldthe
inclusionof intelligentalertingfunctionsto call attentionto critically importantdata.
General Design Concepts and Specific Implementation Details
The biasing effect of the computer's suggestion is problematic in suggesting design solutions. In
our previous report on the study of 30 pilots we suggested that, instead of suggesting a single
plan, expert systems techniques be introduced to allow the computer to suggest the best of each of
the different classes of solutions available (leaving the choice among these alternatives up to the
person). The assumption was that such a choice would influence the person to critically evaluate
the alternative on a more global level. This suggestion still seems appealing after studying the
dispatchers' performances. It is critical, however, to recognize that the user is likely to be strongly
biased to select from one of these computer-generated suggestions. Hence, it would be wise to
embed an expert system on top of the optimization routine that filters out all but conservative
suggestions for presentation to the user (thus putting the burden on the user to identify and evaluate
plans that would in some situations be more risky).
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Theothergeneraldesignconceptsperformedveryfavorablywithoutanycaveats,though.
Whetherwe look atthesubjectiveevaluationsor theperformancedata,it isclearthatthemap
displayandtheassociatedability to sketchroutesandviewforecastswhilemovingtheplanealong
its routeareverydesirablefeatures,reducingthetimeto generatearouteandallowingtheuserto
explore"what-ifs". Similarly,theability to customizedispalyson theweathermapwasused
effectivelyandviewedverypositivelybythedispatchersandpilots. Severalspecific
improvementsto themapdisplayandassociatedfunctionswereidentifiedaspartof thisstudy,
though:
1. Thesystemshouldsupportplansthatinvolvevectoringaswell asflightsalong
jet routes;
Whentheuseris sketchingaroutealongajet route,thecomputershouldhighlight
thejetroutesandnavigationalfixesdirectlyaccessablefrom thelastpointselected
ontheroute. (Otherwise,usersoftenhavedifficulty determiningwhichfixes are
connectedbyjetroutes.);
Onepossibleenhancementwouldbe toallow usersto skipafew navigational
fixeswhensketchingaroute(assumingtherouteis following jetroutes),allowing the
computerto find aconnectingpath. Onepotentialproblem,though,is determining
controllinghowthisrouteshouldbeselectedby thecomputerin termsof avoiding
stormactivity,etc. Anotherconcernwouldbethepossibilitythattheuserwouldbe
lesslikely to criticallyevaluatesuchcomputer-generatedflight segments;
4. A functionthatallowstheuserto zoomin to variablelevelsof detailneedsto be
incorporated,aswell asameanstoeasilymovetheareaof focusnorth,south,eastor
westsothattheusercaneasilylook atadjoiningareason themap. Scrollbars
alongeachedgeof themaparelikely to beaneffectivesolutionto meetthisneed;
.
.
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5. Forecastmapsrepresentingweathereveryhalf houror sofor anextendedperiodbefore
andaftertheflight wouldbedesirable(thoughnotnecessarilyeasyto create),sothat
theusercouldmoreeasilyassesstrendsin theweather.Cautionis necessaryin
designingsuchafeature,though,asit mayfurtherincreasethechancesthattheuserwill
bedrawninto thecomputer's"world" which ignoresuncertaintyin theforecast.(A
meansfor enhancingthe"world" to consideranddisplayuncertaintyis alsoan
interestingdesignchallengethatmeritsfurtherconsideration.);
6. A majorconcernis the"disorientation"observedin somepilotsanddispatchers,
in whichtheyunknowinglylookedat thewrongweather(forecastinsteadof currentor
viceversa).Codingto accomplishthiswill benon-trivial,especiallyasforecastsfor
for moretimeperiodsaremadeavailable;
7. Theplaneiconmightbeenhancedto showtheplane'saltitude,etc.asaboxwithin the
icon,thusintegratingthis informationinto themapdisplay;
8. Additionalweatherandaircraftpositiondatacouldbemadeavailableon themap
display(jetstreams;turbulence;aircraftundertheresponsibilityof thatdispatcher;
aUaircraftin thearea,etc.);
9. A functioncouldbeprovidedto showall of theairportsthattheplanecanreachfor a
diversion,or theairportsthattheplanecanmostquicklyreach.This functionmight
havethesametypeof "cognitiveinterface"thattherouteconstraintsfunctioncurrently
has,allowing theuserto specifiyconstraintsonfactorssuchasrunwaylength,
visibility, emergencyandmaintenancecapabilies,passengerconnections,etc.;
10.Therouteconstraintsfunctioncouldbeenhancedto allow severalotherconstraints
to beset,suchassearchingonly ATC preferredalternateroutes,makingatleastX% of
thepassengerconnections,etc. It couldalsobedesignedto allow theuserto
optimizetimeinsteadof fuel consumption;
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Like themapdisplay,thespreadsheetdisplayfaredverywell in thisevaluation.It wasusedoften
andeffectively. It toocouldbeenhanced,though,by allowingtheuserto embedadditional
graphicsshowingthingslike cloudtops. A designthatallowedtheuserto choosebetweenthe
currentformatandonethatwasscaledto distanceandshowedacontinuous,exactaltitudeprofile
is alsoworthinvestigating.Finally, theability to alterthealtitudeprofileby directmanipulationof
thegraphicdisplaywouldbedesirable.
Onemajorareathatneedsfurtherstudyhasto dowith workloadconcerns.At present,FPT
supportsplanningfor only oneplaneat atime. In reality,dispatchersareresponsiblefor several
planesat atime. Introducingthisaddedcomplexityraisessomefascinatingissuesregarding
displaydesign,andregardingthepotentialto adverselyaffecttheuser'shandlingof thesituation.
Situation Assessment
Two points merit discussion regarding this issue. First, it is clear that the three different versions
of FPT studied here had major impacts on situation assessment, as discussed above. One
interesting speculation regarding the cause of this effect is the suggestion that, having seen the
computer's suggestion, some dispatchers were influenced to look for data and explanations that
accounted for the computer's suggestion, thus changing the set of data viewed and the
interpretation of this data.
Second, this study makes it abundantly clear that dispatchers differ greatly in terms of the mental
models that they develop give a particular set of weather data, and in terms of the factors they
consider in evaluating the "goodness" of a particular route. This has major implications regarding
the need for improved training.
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Final Note
It is clear that currently feasible technologies offer an opportunity to make significant
improvements in the design of tools to aid in flight planning and airspace management. These
improvements can be realized in terms of increased safety, reduced costs, and more efficient and
timely transport of passengers and cargo by air.
It is also clear, though, that for the foreseeable future, these technologies will not be sufficiently
powerful and reliable to fully automate complex tasks like flight planning. Consequently, we need
to better understand how a computer can be designed to effectively work in cooperation with
person, and how computers can be designed to enhance cooperation among different people.
To gain such understanding, we need empirical studies, studies of performance in existing, real
environments and more controlled studies in simulations of existing and more futuristic
environments. We also need to recognize that the activity of developing futuristic environments
like FPT is itself a form of research and a source of insights. Such prototypes provide
representations to help us identify and explore important issues. In short, such prototypes, and the
process of building them, help us to think about the issues more effectively.
Acknowledgements
This research has been supported by NASA Ames Research Center and the FAA under Grant
NCC2-615. Special thanks is given to Roger Beatty, Joe Bertapelli, Rich MiUigan, Craig Parfitt
56
andtheAirline DispatchersFederation,to LarryEarhardt,DebGaldesandDaveWilliams, andto
all of thedispatcherswho donatedtheir timeto makethisstudypossible.
References
Agre, P. E., & Chapman, D. (1989). What are plans for? A.I. Memo #1050a. Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Andriole, S. J. (1989). Handbook of Decision Support Systems. Blue Ridge Summit, PA:
TAB.
Benson, I., Ciborra, C., & Proffitt, S. (1990). Some social and economic consequences of
groupware for flight crew. Proceedings of the Conference on Computer-Supported
Cooperative Work. Baltimore: ACM. 119-129.
Bullen, C. V., & Bennett, J. L. (1990). Learning from user experience with groupware.
Proceedings of the Conference on Computer-Supported Coo_rative Work. Baltimore: ACM.
291-302.
Carroll, J. M., & McKendree, J. (1987). Interface design issues for advice-giving expert
systems. Communications of the ACM. 30(1), 14-31.
Cohen, M. S., Leddo, J. H., & Tolcott, M. A. (1989). Personalized and prescriptive aids for
commercial air flight replanning (Report No. 89-2). Reston, VA: Decision Science
Consortium, Inc.
Coombs, M., & Alty, J. (1987). Expert systems: An alternative paradigm. International Journal
of Man-Machine Studies. 20, 21-43.
Davis, R., & Hamscher, W. (1988). Model-based reasoning: Troubleshooting. In H. E. Shrobe
and AAAI (eds.), Exploring Artificial Intelligence. San Mateo: Kaufmann.
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1985). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Fraser, J. M., Smith, P. J., & Smith, J. W., Jr. (1992). A catalog of errors. International
Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 37, 265-307.
Gentner, D., & Stevens, A. L. (eds.) (1983). Mental models. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Grudin, J. (1991). CSCW: The convergence of two development contexts. CHI '91 Conference
]]LQ.C..C&d],II_. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 91-97.
Hall, N. G. (1988). Diagnosing problems with the user interface for a strategic planning fuzzy
DSS. IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics. 18(4), 638-646.
57
Hayes-Roth,B., & Hayes-Roth,F. (1979). A cognitivemodelof planning. Cognitive Science.
3(4), 275-310.
Hoc, J. M. (1988). Cognitive psychology of planning. London: Academic Press.
Isenberg, D. J. (1986). Thinking and managing: A verbal protocol analysis of managerial
problem solving. Academy of Management Journal. 29(4), 775-788.
Johannsen, G., & Rouse, W. B. (1983). Studies of planning behavior of aircraft pilots in
normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and
Cybernetics. 13(3), 267-278.
Klein, G. A. (1991, in press). A recognition primed decision model of decision making. In G.
A. Klein, R. Calderwood, and J. Orasanu (eds.), Decision making in complex worlds.
Kolodner, J. L., & Kolodner, R. M. (1997). Using experience in clinical problem solving:
Introduction and framework. IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics. 17(3),
420-431.
Larkin, J. H., & Simon, H. A. (1987). Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand
words. Coenitive Science. 11, 65-99.
Layton, C. F., Smith, P. J., McCoy, E., & Bihari, T. (1990). Design concepts for the
development of cooperative problem-solving systems. The Ohio State University. Internal
report.
Lehner, P. E., & Zirk, D. A. (1987). Cognitive factors in user/expert-system interaction. Human
Ea.c,.tg..r_2.2L_, 97-109.
McCloskey, M. (1983). Naive theories of motion. In D. Gentner and A. L. Stevens (eds.),
Mental models (pp. 299-324). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Miller, R. A. (1991). Personal communication.
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. New
York: Holt.
Minsky, M. (1977). Frame-system theory. In P. N. Johnson-Laird and P. C. Wason, eds.,
Thinking; Readings in co_maitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell, C. M., & Salsi, D. L. (1987). Use of model-based qualitative icons and adaptive
windows in workstations for supervisory control systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems.
Man, and Cybernetics. 17(4), 573-593.
Norman, D. A. (1983). Some observations on mental models. In D. Gentner and A. L. Stevens
(eds.), _,al_i..iKO.dg_ (pp. 7-14). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Payne, J. W. (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: An
information search and protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.
16, 366-387.
58
Robertson,S.,Zachery,W.andBlack,J. (eds.)(1990)Cognition. ComDutin_ and Coooeration.
Norwood, NJ:Ablex Publishing Company.
Roth, E. M., Bennett, K. B., & Woods, D. D. (1987). Human interaction with an "intelligent"
machine. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies. 27,479-525.
Roth, E. M., Woods, D. D., & Pople, H. E., Jr. (in press). Cognitive simulation as a tool for
cognitive task analysis. _.
Rudolph, F. M., Homoki, D. A., & Sexton, G. A. (1990). "Divcrter" decision aiding for in-
(Contractor Report No. 182070). Hampton, VA: NASA.
Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. Artificial Intelligence.
5(2), 115-135.
Schank, R., & Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts. plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.:
Erlbaum.
Shute, S., & Smith, P. J. (in press). Knowledge-based search tactics. Information Processes and
Management.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
69, 99-118.
Smith, P.J., McCoy, E., Layton, C. and Bihari, T. (1992). Design Concepts for the
Development of Cooperative Problem-Solving Systems. OSLt Technical Report # CSEL-1992-
07.
Smith, P. J., Miller, T. E., Fraser, J., Smith, J. W., Svirbely, J. R., Rudmann, S., Strohm, P.
L., & Kennedy, M. (1991). An empirical evaluation of the performance of antibody
identification tasks. Transfusion. 21 (4), 313-317.
Sorensen, J. A., Waters, M. H., & Patmore, L. C. (1983). Computer pro_ams for generation
and evaluation of near-optimum vertical flight prof'des (Contractor Report No. 3688).
Hampton, VA: NASA.
Stefik, M. (1981). Planning with constraints: MOLGEN part 1. Artificial Intelligence. 16(2).
111-140.
Stevens, A., Collins, A., & Goldin, S.E. (1979). Misconceptions in student's understanding.
International Journal of Man-Machine Studies. 11,145-156.
Suchman, L. A. (1987). Plans and situated actions: The problem of human machine
f,.9.IIII]_ll_._. New York: Cambridge.
Thierauf, R. J. (1988). User-oriented decision support systems: Accent on t_roblem f'mdin_.
Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall.
Tversky, A. (1972). Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. Psycholowical Review. 79(4),
281-299.
59
Wenger,E. (1987). Artificial intelligence and tutoring systems: Computational and co_maitive
approaches to the communication of knowledge. Los Altos, CA: Kaufman.
Wilensky, R. (1983). Plannin_ and understanding: A computational approach to human
_. Reading, MA: -Addison-Wesley.
60
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure6.
Figure 7.
Figure8.
List of Fi_,ures
Original route (the middle route) and routes explored by sample subjects in Case 1.
High altitude jet routes and navigational fixes.
Right monitor display.
Fuel-efficient, computer suggested route vs. more conservative northern deviations.
Routes explored by sample subjects in Case 2 (plotted on a map showing the
forecast weather).
Original route (the middle route) and suggested alternative routes for Case 3.
Routes considered by the 'sketching only' subjects in Case 3.
Current composite radar for Case 4.
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